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ZONING IN WASHINGTON:
THE "FAIRLY DEBATABLE" RULE
In Anderson v. Island County,' the Supreme Court of Washington
held as arbitrary and capricious the rezoning, from residential to
commercial, of a cement-batching plant site on the grounds that the
plant's adverse effects on the environment outweighed the public
benefits to be provided by the plant.2
On March 11, 1966, Island Sand and Gravel, Inc. (I.S. & G.), began
gravel operations on 17 acres in the Holmes Harbor area of Whidbey
Island, Washington, a residential area. Nine months later, the Board
of County Commissioners for Island County passed an interim zon-
ing ordinances which zoned the entire Holmes Harbor area as resi-
dential. At the same time I.S. & G. was beginning construction
of a cement-batching plant on its Holmes Harbor land. In 1969,
I.S. & G. applied for a conditional use permit4 to operate its cement-
batching plant but later withdrew its application. On September 22,
I.S. & G. applied to the Island County Planning Commission (an
agency subordinate to the Board of County Commissioners) to have
its 17-acre tract rezoned from residential to commercial. After a public
hearing, this request was denied.
On October 21, 1969, I.S. k G. appealed to the Board of County
Commissioners, which overruled the Planning Commission and re-
zoned I.S. & G.'s land to the "commercial" category on the basis that
the services of I.S. 8 G. were necessary for the growth and develop-
ment of Island County. Plaintiffs in Anderson, residents of Holmes
Harbor, brought a certiorari action in the state superior court to re-
view the zoning change. The trial judge sustained the rezoning, and
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington.
Zoning acts and amendments to zoning ordinances which constitute
rezoning are presumed to be constitutional and valid. 5 Since the
1. 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972).
2. Id. at-., 501 P.2d at 602.
3. See WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 36.70.790 (1964).
4. Id. § 36.70.810-.900.
5. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.10 (1968) and cases
cited therein [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; 8 E. McQuILLMN, MuNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 25.93 (3d ed. 1965).
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landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,6 upholding the constitutionality of
comprehensive zoning ordinances, the courts have had two tasks
whenever examining zoning ordinances or regulations. First, the courts
must determine whether the particular zoning ordinance in question,
and the regulations promulgated under it, are within the permissible
scope of the municipal zoning power.7 To determine this, the courts
have developed the "general welfare" test: a zoning ordinance will
be upheld only if it is reasonably related to the general welfare of
the public.8 But the evolution of zoning cases has been a continuing
expansion by the courts of the "general welfare" test. 9 Because of this
expansion, the test has, in most jurisdictions, ceased to be a serious
bar to regulation. 0 Second, the courts must determine whether the
application of an ordinance, otherwise constitutional, is "reasonable,"
that is, whether a valid ordinance is being applied reasonably in the
context of its own fact situation.1 A zoning ordinance will be con-
sidered to have failed the test of reasonableness if it is either arbi-
trary, confiscatory or discriminatory in its application.12 The courts
have used a variety of standards's when zoning regulations have been
held unreasonable, but in general it can be said that a zoning
regulation is unreasonable when there is no rational relationship
between the objective of the regulation and its application to a
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. See ANDERSON § 7.03.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 2.10. See also Note, Protection of Environmental Quality in Non-
Metropolitan Regions by Limiting Development, 57 IA. L. REv. 126, 134 (1971).
10. Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Com-
munity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Extractions, 73
YALE L.J. 1119, 1123 (1964).
11. A primary consideration in ascertaining the reasonableness of a zoning
classification is whether there has been a substantial changing trend in the de-
velopment of the zoned area or whether it remained substantially unchangcd in
character. Scott v. City of Springfield, 83 Ill. App. 2d 31, 39, 226 N.E.2d 57,
61 (1967).
12. See 1 A. RATHxOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 4, at 4-2(1972). For an excellent discussion of whether zoning restrictions for the pur-
pose of environmental protection are confiscatory and thus unreasonable see Note,
The Scope of State and Local Government Action in Environmental Land Use
Regulation, 13 B.C. IND. & Comt. L. REv. 782 (1972).
13. See generally 1 A. RATEKOPF, supra note 12, ch. 5.
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particular parcel of land.14 The burden of proving unreasonableness
is upon the party challenging the ordinance.' 5
If, however, the reasonableness of the zoning action is "fairly de-
batable," the courts will generally uphold the action. 16 That is, if
"reasonable minds could differ" as to whether a zoning regulation is
or is not arbitrary, discriminatory or confiscatory, the courts will not
substitute their judgment for that of the zoning agency.17 This
"fairly debatable" rule governs the propriety of changing the status
or classification of an area, and protects the judgment of zoning auth-
orities as to whether or not there has been a change of conditions
justifying rezoning.' But the dispute under the "fairly debatable"
rule must concern not mere words or expressions of opinion but
basic physical facts pertinent to issues arising under applications of
zoning ordinances; a mere difference of opinion does not require a
finding that the reasonableness of a regulation is debatable. 9 Though
the courts give consistent verbal adherence to the rule, they have
not necessarily abdicated their power to review zoning regulations. 20
Decisions which conclude that zoning ordinances are unconstitutional
as applied to specific property are not uncommon, and many such
decisions are reached upon a finding that the litigant attacking the
zoning regulation has taken the issue beyond the reach of reasonable
debate. -1 There is no shortage of cases in which courts have seen no
14. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 10, at 1124. See also I A. RATHaOPF,
supra note 12, ch. 5.
15. ANDERSON § 2.15. For a discussion of the burden of proof on applicants
for exceptions to zoning laws see Comment, Burden of Proof in Special Excep-
tin Cases, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 233.
16. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d
342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) ; Willdel Realty, Inc.
v. New Castle County, 281 A.2d 612 (Del. 1971); Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17,
118 A.2d 401 (1955); Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash. 2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955);
State ex rel. Morrison v. City of Seattle, 6 Wash. App. 181, 492 P.2d 1078 (1971).
See also 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 25.281.
17. ANDERSON § 2.16.
18, Id.
19. 8 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 25.281. See, e.g., People v. Village of
Elmwood Park, 27 Ill. 2d 177, 188 N.E.2d 684 (1963) (mere fact that munici-
pality introduced evidence in support of ordinance does not mean that reason-
ableness of ordinance is debatable).
20. ANDERSON § 2.16 and cases cited therein.
21. Id.
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fairly debatable issue, although a review of the record contains facts
which appear to provide ample support for a difference of opinion.22
In most Washington cases,23 however, the supreme court has used
the "fairly debatable" rule to justify its refusal to investigate the
validity of a zoning regulation under the reasonableness test.24 Thus,
in three cases with fact patterns similar to that in Anderson, the
court failed to question the reasonableness of a zoning regulation be-
cause there was an "honest difference of opinion." In State ex rel.
Smilanich v. McCoaUum,25 plaintiffs appealed a zoning action which
granted a conditional use permit to an asphalt-batching plant in a
residential area. The trial court upheld the zoning board's decision,
and in affirming the judgment on appeal the Supreme Court of
Washington said:
[C]ourts will resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of the valid-
ity of the enactment . . . .That the nonconforming use of the
area by the gravel processing and asphalt processing plants is
detrimental to residences is unquestioned .... The determination
as to whether the area was an "undeveloped area" . . . was a
matter of discretion on the part of the commission and the
board. 26
The court thus adopted an essentially laissez-faire attitude toward
the reasonableness test by bowing to the zoning body's "discretion."
This attitude was limited only slightly in McNaughton v. Boeing,27
a suit brought by owners of a residential property located next to a
23-acre tract rezoned from residential to business for a shopping
center. Again, the trial court upheld the zoning action. The Supreme
22. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Skokle, 26 Ill. 2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962),
noted in 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 116.
23. An exception to this practice has been the court's decisions in the "spot
zoning" cases, in which the court essentially ignored the fairly debatable rule.
Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969); Anderson v.
City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 198, 390 P.2d 994 (1964); Pierce v. King County,
62 Wash. 2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963). See also D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING
DmEmmA 115 (1971).
24. In Washington, the reasonableness test is not met only if there is a
"manifest abuse of discretion." State ex rel. Smilanich v. McCollum, 62 Wash.
2d 602, 384 P.2d 358 (1963). Such an abuse of discretion is defined as "arbi-
trary and capricious conduct." Lilhions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash. 2d 629, 289 P.2d
203 (1955).
25. 62 Wash. 2d 602, 384 P.2d 358 (1963).
26. Id. at 606, 609, 384 P.2d at 361, 363.
27. 68 Wash. 2d 659, 414 P.2d 778 (1966).
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Court of Washington, in affirming the lower court, admitted that
the zoning regulation could be overturned if it were arbitrary or
capricious, but "under the facts in this case, there was room for two
opinions. This was shown by the testimony that there were those
who favored and others who protested the adoption of the Com-
missions's recommendation."2S Since there will undoubtedly be both
proponents and opponents of any zoning action, the Boeing court's
unusual interpretation of the fairly debatable rule left Washington
zoning agencies still comparatively free of the reasonableness test.
This trend was continued in State ex rel. Myhre v. City of
Spokane,0-9 an action by residential property owners to review the
validity of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which reclassified
property from residential to business-commercial. This rezoning
would enable a shopping center to be built on the land in question.
Plantiffs contended that the rezoning action was arbitrary and capri-
cious. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiffs, pointing out that
the population of the area was growing, that there was no evidence
that the shopping center was needed, 0 and that the rezoning would
definitely have an adverse effect on adjacent landowners.3 1 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the rezoning ac-
tion, finding that it was reasonably related to the general welfare,
and that "[ilt is not an abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious
conduct for public officers to accept the conclusions of proponents
of an issue which is honestly debatable."32 The court thus continued
its broad interpretation of the fairly debatable rule despite consider-
able evidence that reasonable men could differ on the issue of whether
the rezoning was in the public interest.
The court in McCollum, Boeing, and Spokane seemed to be using
a simple difference of opinion as to the value of a zoning change to
justify the application of the fairly debatable rule. This is a de-
parture from the general interpretation of the rule, which does not
require a finding that the reasonableness of a regulation is debatable
simply because there is a difference of opinion on the worth of the
28. Id. at 663, 414 P.2d at 780, citing Liflions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash. 2d 629,
633-34, 289 P.2d 203, 205 (1955) (emphasis added).
29. 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
30. Id. at 219, 422 P.2d at 797 (dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 221, 422 P.2d at 798 (dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 213, 422 P.2d at 794.
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zoning action. The Anderson court, however, approached the prob-
lem with a different attitude. First, the court decided that it could
review the record de novo, because the record both at trial and at
appeal consisted entirely of written and graphic material.8 3 Then
the court examined the findings of fact made by the Island County
Board of Commissioners.3' In contrast with the McCollum, Boeing,
and Spokane cases, however, the Anderson court did not treat these
findings of fact by the zoning agency with great deference. Instead,
the court was willing to weigh the environmental aspects of rezoning
against the positive benefits. Testimony of neighboring property
owners at the hearing before the Board of Commissioners described
the plant operation as "noisy, dirty, unattractive .... dust producing,
screeching . . . until all hours of the night, . . [a] dangerous nui-
sance." The court pointed out that nothing in the record indicated
that I.S. z G. soil was unique or different from the surrounding
area, or that the condition of the soil was not known at the time the
interim zoning ordinance was passed.36 Furthermore, there was no
validity to the finding that I.S. & G. was essential because of the
growth, development, and employment opportunities it would pro-
vide the area.37 Thus the court concluded that because of the adverse
effect the batching plant would have on neighboring property own-
ers, the rezoning did not bear a substantial relationship to the public
welfare or interest. The court then dealt with the fairly debatable
rule:
Keeping in mind the rule that an honest difference of opinion
upon this issue is sufficient to uphold the action of the Board of
County Commissioners, we now consider the proceedings more
closely to determine whether, in fact, reasonable men could differ
regarding the relation of the zoning action to the public interest.
This closer analysis leads us to conclude that the action of the
Board of Commissioners was arbitrary and capricious.38
33. 81 Wash. 2d at-, 501 P.2d at 597.
34. The Board had found that I.S. & G. would provide a needed source of
employment. The trial court agreed with these findings. Id. at -, 501 P.2d at
598.
35. Id. at -, 501 P.2d at 598.
36. Id. at -, 501 P.2d at 598.
37. Recognizing that similar operations on the island are available to pro-
vide needed products and services without creating a threat to the health
and welfare of neighboring landowners, it is evident that the need to rezone
the property in question to commercial in the middle of a residential zone is
considerably outweighed by the detriment to the public.
Id. at -, 501 P.2d at 599.
38. Id. at -, 501 P.2d at 599.
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Despite the fact that the members of the local zoning agency and the
trial court agreed that the zoning change was in the public interest
(and therefore there certainly was an "honest difference of opinion"
with the viewpoint of plaintiffs) the court concluded that the issue
was not "fairly debatable."
It seems apparent, then, that the fairly debatable rule no longer
has the same influence on decisions of the court as it did in Mc-
Collum, Boeing, and Spokane. For in Anderson there was at least as
much difference of opinion among reasonable men regarding the
rezoning action as there existed in McCollum, Boeing, and Spokane;
but contrary to those cases, the Anderson court did not use difference
of opinion as an excuse to justify an unwillingness to weigh environ-
mental factors.
It is obvious that there seldom will be a zoning action which does
not have both proponents and opponents who are, at least ostensibly,
"reasonable men." Because of this, the "fairly debatable" rule in
Washington operated, in effect, to ratify the decisions of the zoning
agencies. In Anderson, the court saw that there were clearly many
reasons why the zoning action in question was unreasonable. Yet it
was also clear that, by its previous standards, the dispute was "fairly
debatable" and thus the zoning action would have to be upheld. The
court's only alternative to sustaining an obvious injustice was to
dcange its interpretation of the fairly debatable rule, refusing to
apply it simply because there was a difference of opinion on the
worth of the zoning action. This is the de facto course taken by the
tourt. Thus, the Anderson court has apparently removed a major
obstacle to judicial application of the reasonableness test in Wash-
ington.
Daniel N. Steven
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